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incentives or some other issues is difficult to judge, but it is another critical
problem that needs to be addressed.”
~ William Dudley1
I. INTRODUCTION
Reports about misconduct in the financial sector are seemingly endless.
Misconduct is wide-ranging and varied—from abusive practices in mortgage
securities and commodities markets to manipulation of foreign exchange and
interest rates.2 Truly, the reports suggest an ethical crisis in finance. A major
complaint is about the lack of serious efforts to hold to account executives that
engaged in misconduct or were in leadership positions at the banks. The events
call into question the adequacy of the current arrangements for ensuring
integrity in the financial sector, at the institutional and individual levels.
This paper examines developments in the financial sector and identifies a
role for regulatory ethics in promoting integrity and accountability. In this
effort, the paper also explores theoretical perspectives in ethics and how they
can shape business behavior. Specifically, the article proposes corporate codes
of ethics, a mandatory requirement under the New York Stock Exchange
Listing Rules, as instruments to promote morality in corporate conduct. Ethics
codes, which are internally generated, must be tailored to reflect the experience
and made more effective. They can be amplified to specify standards to govern
the fiduciary duty of care applicable to executives, personal integrity and
accountability. This method can be effective in shaping the moral climate in
corporations and in checking misconduct.
Wrongful conduct reported against banks is wide-ranging and varied.
Following are the major classes of misconduct:
Mortgage-related issues, at both ends:
o Practices adopted for selling mortgage securities to
investors,3 and
o Foreclosure procedures in dealing with delinquent


*Associate Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section. A
version of this paper was presented at a conference, Normative Business Ethics in a Global
Economy: New Directions in Donaldsonian Themes, held at The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, October 17–18, 2014. I thank the participants for their valuable
comments. Errors and omissions are, of course, my responsibility.
1
William C. Dudley, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Remarks at the Global Economic Policy Forum, New York: Ending Too Big to Fail (Nov. 7,
2013), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud131107.html.
2
See infra Parts II–V.
3
See infra Section III.A.3
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mortgages4
Transactions in non-financial markets—for example, commodities
futures5
Interest rate manipulation (LIBOR)6
Manipulative practices in foreign exchange markets7
Questionable hiring practices in foreign jurisdictions8
Obviously, several factors shaped the trends.
They included
macroeconomic developments, mainly financial deregulation and switch to
market-determined interest and exchange rates. The developments facilitated
financial innovation, often questionable in content. In particular, deregulation
enabled banks’ entry into non-traditional fields including power and
commodities. Banks were, quite understandably, natural players in the interest
and exchange rate space. These activities became profit centers. Incentive
systems were designed to boost business performance and results. For
corporate actors who engaged in misconduct, personal gain linked to business
results was often a major consideration. These realities inform the efforts
made in this paper to interpret events in the financial sector in ethical terms.
The paper has four parts, including this Introduction. The next part
examines some theories of business ethics and the different standards they
prescribe for evaluating behavior.9 The third part presents an ethical analysis
of the major types of misconduct reported against banks, examining them
against the standards advocated in ethical theory.10 The fourth part reviews the
outcomes faced by delinquent banks, which are mainly regulatory fines and
sporadic disciplinary actions against individual executives involved in
wrongdoing.11 Government agencies have targeted the banks and procured
financial settlements.12 Put differently, the effort has mostly been restricted to
accountability of banks, at the institutional level.13 Action against executives


4
Nelson D. Schwartz & Sheila Dewan, $26 Billion Deal Is Said to Be Set for Homeowners,
N.Y. T IMES , Feb. 9, 2012, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/business/statesnego
tiate-25-billion-deal-for-homeowners.html?_r=0.
5
See infra Section III.B.
6
See infra Section III.C.
7
See id.
8
Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Bank Tracked Business Linked to China Hiring,
N.Y. T IMES , Dec. 8, 2013, at A1, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/07/bank-tabulatedbusiness-linked-to-china-hiring/.
9
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part III.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
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who engaged in wrongful conduct has been limited.14
Finally, the fifth part advocates the strengthening of corporate codes of
ethics to promote business integrity and accountability.15 Ethical codes are
now a regulatory requirement and they provide a ready vehicle for codifying
the norms to govern executive behavior.16 Thomas Donaldson argued that
internally developed norms can be effective in promoting an ethical culture in
corporations and in avoiding the shortcomings of regulation, such as
recalcitrance.17
II. FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT—AN ETHICAL EVALUATION
As pointed out, interpreting some varieties of financial misconduct in
ethical terms can be problematic. This is about the business purposes that
inspired the questionable behavior. For instance, the hiring decisions at
JPMorgan Chase were made, obviously, to please powerful interests in a large
overseas market.18 Is the ethical argument weaker because the decision was
made ostensibly for corporate benefit? Can business advantage be an
appropriate measure? There can be similar difficulties in dealing with banks’
derivatives business. A common refrain is that there was insufficient
understanding of the risks in credit derivatives. Is there an ethical aspect to the
decision to take up business in credit derivatives without adequate knowledge
and awareness? Was there an ethical failure when executives, through their
actions, imposed on the banks risks they did not fully appreciate?
The apparent ethical tension makes it necessary to flesh out more clearly
the boundaries of legitimate business conduct and possible transgressions. The
definitional issue is a necessary first step in applying the yardstick of ethics.
This part consists of two sections. The first reviews some of the standards that
have been prescribed in ethical theory and the second attempts to identify an
equilibrium standard for business conduct.
A. Ethical Standards and Their Different Shades
The ethical standards that have been prescribed by theorists vary
significantly in degree. On the one hand, there is the conventional “honesty is


14

Id.
See infra Part IV.
16
Id.
17
Thomas Donaldson, Hedge Fund Ethics, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 405 (2008).
18
Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 8.
15
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the best policy” standard.19 This approach eschews idealism, more or less, and
views ethics largely as instrumental in promoting business. On the other, there
are more absolute standards that present ethical behavior as intrinsically
good.20 John Dobson stressed “virtue ethics” and was not overly concerned
with the business outcomes of moral conduct.21 Then there is the middle
ground that avoids strict formulations.22 This is the “moral free space” for
business corporations that Donaldson and Dunfee identified.23 These differing
perspectives, examined below, point towards the need to identify an optimal
standard.
1. Instrumental Ethics
In general, financial theory of recent decades perceives ethical
elements—for example, trust and reputation—as market-generated and driven
by the motive of wealth maximization.24 Diamond noted similar profit-seeking
behavior in debt markets in nurturing trust among participants.25 The idea is
that the wealth maximization motive can inspire proper business conduct.26
This mode of thinking was carried even further in the law-and-economics
movement that was influential in the 1980s and 1990s.27 For example,
Easterbrook and Fischel argued that issues such as social responsibility must be
left to the financial markets.28 Investors will have the freedom to choose
between companies that were socially responsible and those that were not. In
this approach, wealth maximization trumped ethical concerns.
The instrumental view of ethics is aligned to a bias against regulation. A
rather extreme anti-regulation argument came from Alan Greenspan, then chair


19

See generally Gabriel Abend, T HE M ORAL B ACKGROUND : A N I NQUIRY I NTO THE
H ISTORY OF B USINESS E THICS (2014).
20
See, e.g., John Dobson, Ethics in Finance II, 53 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15 (1997).
21
Id.
22
Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Ties that Bind in Business Ethics: Social
Contracts and Why They Matter, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 1853 (2002).
23
Id.
24
See, e.g., Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371 (1977).
25
Douglas W. Diamond, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. POL. ECON. 828
(1989).
26
Id.
27
See, e.g., id.
28
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, T HE E CONOMIC S TRUCTURE OF
C ORPORATE L AW (1991).
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of the Federal Reserve.29 Greenspan called for abolishing the statute against
fraud. Brooksley Born, former head of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), stated: “[Alan Greenspan] explained there wasn't a need
for a law against fraud because if a floor broker was committing fraud, the
customer would figure it out and stop doing business with him.”30
To be clear, market practices can be effective in checking misconduct.
This is true, but the argument is probably more valid when the times are
“normal.” The range and volume of misconduct recently seen in banks suggest
that the times were quite far from normal. When the culture and climate are in
reasonable order with no major patterns of lax conduct, markets can internalize
ethics. This can be so even if the driving considerations are amoral and the
incentive is financial gain, rather than virtue.
The limits of market as the source of ethical behavior are evident in the
saga of the financial sector. Patterns of wrongful behavior prevailed across
banks and in a range of activities—a veritable epidemic.31 These suggest a
significant change in market culture. There was greater tolerance of wrongful
behavior, evident, for example, from collusive practices among executives
across banks in LIBOR manipulation.32 The experience underscores the need
for more robust and nuanced frameworks that are not entirely dependent on
current moods in markets.
2. Virtue Ethics
Another school argues for a stronger, absolute version of ethics. It
perceives ethical behavior as an end in itself, more or less. John Dobson
advocated this more robust version and termed the concept virtue ethics. In the
context of creative accounting practices, he argued for traveling beyond
external criteria, such as expectations of the users of financial statements or the
utilitarian goal of generating overall benefit. According to Dobson, these
considerations are no more than constraints on behavior and they hardly
promote virtue.33 Earlier in 1993, Dobson treated ethical behavior as an inner
issue for individuals,34 tracing it to older traditions that date back to David


29
Manuel Roig-Franiza, Brooksley Born, the Cassandra of the Derivatives Crisis, W ASH .
P OST (May 26, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR
2009052502108.html.
30
Id. Born had sounded early warnings about the risks in derivatives. Id.
31
See id.
32
See id.
33
Dobson, supra note 20.
34
John Dobson, The Role of Ethics, 49 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 57 (1993).
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Hume (1711–1776)35 and Adam Smith (1723–1790)36.
For virtue ethics, an important point of distinction from instrumental
ethics is the concern in virtue ethics with the “internal” aspect.37 Even before
Dobson, the internal dimension had been emphasized by MacIntyre.38 In virtue
ethics, rectitude is inspired by inner needs and urges of individuals, rather than
external factors, such as quest for wealth or recognition.39 To put it differently,
instrumental ethics relies on sensory attractions and worldly incentives to guide
behavior.40 In contrast, virtue ethics understands morality as an inner quality,
driven by higher spiritual needs rather than acquisitive and possessive qualities,
dictated by sensory attractions.41
Virtue ethics sets a lofty bar. Given the imperfections in human
character and personality, there can be challenges in implementing virtue
ethics, without denying its value as an ideal. It would probably be easier for
individuals to practice virtue ethics, but it would be more challenging at the
collective or corporate level. We can only speculate how far the human species
has evolved to a level where a large majority can rise above sensory attractions
and sensual temptations and have the ability to do right, regardless of anything.
Yet history shows the difference leadership can make. Moral exemplars, such
as George Washington and Mahatma Gandhi, inspired large numbers of people
to sacrifice immediate gain and accept hardship in pursuit of higher goals.42
However, moral exemplars and inspirational phases happen only
sporadically. In the recent deluge of financial misconduct, the opposite was
probably true. It was apparently one misdeed inspiring another and one
wrongdoer leading another.
Judge Hellerstein, in convicting Kareem
Serageldin of Credit Suisse of inflating the value of securities to hide losses,
described Serageldin’s conduct as “a small piece of an overall evil climate


35

Maurice Cranston, David Hume, ENCYC. BRITTANICA, http://www.britannica.com/
biography/David-Hume (last updated May 21, 2015).
36
Robert L. Heilbroner, Adam Smith, ENCYC. BRITTANICA, http://www.britannica.com/
biography/Adam-Smith (last updated Nov. 23, 2014).
37
Dobson, supra note 20, at 16.
38
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A FTER V IRTUE : A S TUDY IN M ORAL T HEORY (2d ed. 1984).
39
Dobson, supra note 20, at 16–17.
40
See id. at 16.
41
See id. at 16–17. The Indian spiritual classic, Katha Upanishad, states that the human face
with its sensory openings focuses on the outer world; it is only the wise that turn their gaze inward.
VALERIE J. ROEBUCK, T HE U PANISHADS 327 (1st ed. 2000). In keeping with the democratic spirit
of the present age and collective arrangements (such as governments and corporations) that
dominate life, it is perhaps necessary to strive for greater diffusion of this variety of wisdom.
42
See Dobson, supra note 20, at 17–18 (discussing the impact leaders have on the ethics of
the entire organization).
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inside that bank and many other banks.”43
A greater problem in actualizing virtue ethics is the corporate stock
market system in which executives function. Greenfield pointed out the
difficulties for executives operating under a fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder wealth and an amoral climate that treats financial penalties for
infractions as a part of the cost of doing business.44 Yet the recent financial
misconduct and the penalties banks have paid to settle with governments
indicate the perils in adopting amoral approaches and striving towards wealth
maximization with little regard for other factors.
3. Moral Free Space—A Middle Ground?
Between the poles of instrumental ethics and virtue ethics, Donaldson
and Dunfee offer a more open and adaptive framework.45 This is the
Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT).46 This model eschews setting
rigid standards for companies and is more sensitive to the dynamic
environment in which businesses operate.47 At the same time, a minimum
standard of conduct is emphasized.48 Donaldson and Dunfee explained that the
“moral free space” in their construct permits “nations and other economic
communities to shape their distinctive concepts of economic fairness, but it
draws the line at flagrant neglect of core human values.”49 In this framework,
morality would be conditional or situational.50 Donaldson and Dunfee offered
an illustration by referring to recent changes in the expectations framework in
which corporations now function; in addition to competitive advantages,
corporations must now pay attention to “a variety of issues involving fairness
and quality of life.”51
ISCT has at its core the notion that ethical standards evolve in societies
according to the ideas and values of the time.52 It reflects, somewhat, the


43

Rachel Abrams & Peter Lattman, Ex-Credit Suisse Executive Sentenced in Mortgage Bond
Case, N.Y. T IMES , Nov. 23, 2013, at B3, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/ex-creditsuisse-executive-sentenced-in-mortgage-case/?_r=0 (quoting J. Hellerstein).
44
Kent Greenfield, Corporate Ethics in a Devilish System, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 427, 428
(2008).
45
See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 22, at 1859.
46
Id. at 1854.
47
Id. at 1859.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1855.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
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Hegelian concept of zeitgeist, or the spirit of the times.53 This implies that the
ethical standard is not static.54 Rather it constantly evolves, as a product of
broad societal consensus.55 In essence, ISCT avoids the polar positions of
instrumental ethics, which gives a freer rein to primeval instincts and virtue
ethics, which operates at a more rarefied level.56 ISCT is sensitive to the
corporate or collective character of ethics in contemporary business,
particularly in comparison with virtue ethics, which can be quite challenging at
the collective level.57 However, ISCT hesitates to be prescriptive and this can
limit its ability to deal with ethical epidemics such as the crisis in the financial
sector.
B. Searching for an Equilibrium Standard
The goals and emphasis vary quite dramatically in the ethical standards
that have been prescribed by theorists. Virtue ethics sets the bar high. Without
detracting from its aspirational value, it is probably too lofty for realistic
application to business behavior. At the other end, instrumental ethics and
wealth maximization goals can justify a sizable part of the wrongful behavior
reported against banks. The need is for a unifying theory that offers an optimal
or equilibrium standard. Basic moral precepts (do not lie, be fair, respect the
environment, and the like) are important, but such broad-brush concepts cannot
provide full moral clarity to enterprises.58 Rather, the goal must be to develop
an ethical culture that encourages the practice of moral precepts. Recent
financial misconduct provides a useful context to explore these issues.
There are at least three dimensions to the challenges in developing a
climate that encourages business rectitude, and these are interrelated. First,
business behavior occurs mostly in the corporate setting, which is a collective
arrangement.59 It is not just individuals doing their own things; rather, it is
individuals in groups engaging in corporate, collaborative action that has its
own logic and rationale. At the next level, corporate enterprises operate in
competitive markets and their practices are often shaped by trends in the


53
Zeitgeist, ENCYC. BRITTANICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Zeitgeist-philosophy (last
visited Oct. 6, 2015).
54
See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 22, at 1855.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, T IES THAT B IND : A S OCIAL C ONTRACTS
A PPROACH TO B USINESS E THICS 8 (1999) [hereinafter T IES THAT B IND ].
59
See Dobson, supra note 20, at 21.
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market.60 These factors are exogenous, at least in a limited sense.61 They are
the second aspect.62 The third is incentives—a thing economic theory often
overemphasizes.63
The dynamics of business behavior and their intersection with ethics are
Derivatives are
apparent in Citigroup’s credit derivatives business.64
particularly appropriate for ethical analysis because of the complex nature of
these instruments and reports about inadequate understanding of the risks in
them.65 The ambiguity was highlighted by Judge Jed Rakoff, in the context of
criminal law.66 Judge Rakoff questioned whether the banks’ brush with
derivatives was merely a case of negligence or “at least in part, . . . fraudulent
practice[ ], of dubious mortgages portrayed as sound risks and packaged into
ever more esoteric financial instruments, the fundamental weaknesses of which
were intentionally obscured?”67 There is no clear answer to this question.
Citigroup recently made a $7 billion settlement with the Department of Justice
to close the charges over its mortgage securities business.68 The story of
Citigroup’s derivatives business brings out some important dynamics of
corporate conduct, the play of hierarchical influences, and the impact of
personal friendships. They underscore the complexities of corporate ethics.
1. Individual Behavior and the Corporate Setting
Business ethics in the corporate context, to state the obvious, is not
simply about individuals making their own moral choices. Many times, they
could be acting under organizational pressures, possibly even against their
personal judgment.69 Citigroup made a rather late plunge into credit


60

See id. at 21–22.
See id.
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. R EV . B OOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/
jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Michael Corkery, Citi Settles Mortgage Securities Inquiry for $7 Billion, N.Y. T IMES , July
15, 2014, at B1, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/citigroup-and-u-s-reach-7-billionmortgage-settlement/?_r=0. This is subject to a caveat: given the circumstances, it is not clear
whether the mere act of making a settlement can be treated as admission of wrongdoing by banks.
See infra Section II.B.1. The settlement could be no more than a strategy to buy peace and to show
contrition. These would be useful from a business standpoint in the prevailing atmosphere of
hostility to the financial sector, exemplified by the Occupy Wall Street movement.
69
This problem is true of any collective setting. A major ethical question is how far
individuals who are a part of the system have the moral freedom to act according to their
61
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derivatives business. The company became active in the business in 2002
when Charles Prince became the head of corporate and investment banking.70
Prince, understandably, wished to improve business, and turned to derivatives
for generating greater volumes.71 Between 2003 and 2005, Collateralized Debt
Obligations (CDO) issued by Citigroup went up from $6 billion to over $20
billion.
The chain was complicated. Charles Prince, who was instrumental in
Citigroup’s derivatives business, had little personal knowledge on the subject.72
He was encouraged in joining the derivatives bandwagon by Robert Rubin,
who at the time was a director on the bank’s board.73 Rubin had impressive
credentials as a former Goldman Sachs executive and Treasury Secretary under
President Clinton.74 Incidentally, he was also among the leading proponents of
financial deregulation in the 1990s.75 Rubin reportedly urged Prince saying:
“You have to take more risk if you want to earn more.”76 To be fair, a factor in
Rubin’s recommendation of derivatives business was a concern that Citigroup
was falling behind rivals such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs.77 This
is dealt with in the next subsection in the discussion on competitive pressures.78
Another issue was with the risk oversight function in Citigroup.79 This
was about personal friendship among longstanding employees.80 Thomas
Maheras, the functional head of derivatives trading, Randolph Barker, the
deputy of Maheras, and David Bushnell, the senior risk officer charged with
monitoring risk were all colleagues of long standing.81 Reportedly, the
personal friendship among them affected the quality of oversight and in 2008
the Federal Reserve made a “scathing review” of risk management at


conscience without risking adverse impact. The recently-developed whistle-blower mechanism
seeks to empower diligent employees and even provide an economic incentive to them.
70
Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets,
N.Y. T IMES , Nov. 23, 2008, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html?page
wanted=all.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). There is an interesting aside from the perspectives
of corporate governance and accountability. Dash and Creswell described Rubin as “an architect
of the bank’s strategy,” and pointed out that he “did not have direct responsibility for a Citigroup
unit.” Id. This would be a case of an individual initiating an action without responsibility for its
consequences.
77
Id.
78
See infra Section II.B.2.
79
Dash & Creswell, supra note 70.
80
Id.
81
Id.
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Citigroup.82
Superior-subordinate relationships and interpersonal ties are among the
influences that shape behavior in corporations, as the Citigroup story indicates.
They mold decision-making and determine outcomes. In the setting described,
it is debatable whether the decision to do business in derivatives could have
been avoided, even with greater knowledge about their complexities and risks.
Individual employees can hardly disagree with the strategy determined by the
leadership. Leaving aside ethical conundrums, consequences can be serious for
subordinate employees in hierarchical organizations unwilling to act according
to directions.
2. Competitive Pressures and Their Impact
Market competition was a major consideration in Robert Rubin’s efforts
to promote derivatives business in Citigroup.83 When competitors were active
in the business and were earning sizable profits, it would be challenging for
Citigroup to stay away merely on principle or for lack of expertise. In a
company operating in competitive markets, under relentless scrutiny from
media and equity analysts, CEOs can ignore an apparently profitable business
only at their own peril. Charles Prince stated in mid-2007 at the peak of the
derivatives saga, just before the implosion in 2008: “When the music stops, in
terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is
playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”84
Seemingly flippant, yet Prince’s statement accurately reflected the
transient nature of the derivatives business as well as the competitive pressures
of the market. Liquidity was a product of trade in derivatives by the major
banks, which made it hard for other players to stay away from the melee.
Prudence, while probably valid for bankers of an earlier age, would have been
out of place in Wall Street, circa 2007 AD. In the new age, the ethics that
underpin prudence could be a casualty.
3. Incentives and Their Power
The third dimension is incentives. Competitive pressures and staying
ahead in the market are about profits for corporations. The incentives are


82

Id.
Id.
84
Michiyo Nakomoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-Outs, F IN .
T IMES (July 9, 2007, 10:08 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-0000779
fd2ac.html#axzz3njjQR1hp.
83
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organizational. For executives, a more direct and personal reward would be
bonus. Compensation structures generally link pay to performance. This
assures executives of personal benefit and sensitizes them to competition and
market developments. Thomas Maheras, head of Citigroup’s derivatives
business, was among the most highly paid employees and made over $30
million at the peak.85 His deputy Randolph Barker made between $15 million
and $20 million.86
Financial incentives are an important influence on executive behavior.
Directions set by organizational superiors and financial reward motivate
executives to pursue business opportunities. In this pursuit, ethical ambiguities
might not be serious deterrents as long as there is no criminality. This supports
the argument made in the concluding part for personal accountability as a
powerful incentive in providing a better ethical compass for executives.87
III. FINANCIAL WRONGDOING—SEEN THROUGH THE ETHICAL LENS
The misconduct reported against banks is wide-ranging and varied. Each
type—mortgage securities and interest rate manipulation, to name two—is
different in character and warrants individual analysis from an ethical
perspective. This part examines the instances of financial misconduct through
the ethical lens. The analysis begins with credit derivatives,88 which are
probably the most challenging from the ethical standpoint. The position with
most other types of misconduct is relatively straightforward. For instance,
manipulation of currency and interest rates involved breach of a basic moral
precept: Do not lie.89 Similarly, bank operations in commodities markets
amounted to profiteering which has been recognized for a long time as
unethical, often even illegal. This part consists of three sections that deal with
credit derivatives,90 banks’ operations in non-financial markets,91 and
manipulative practices in forex and interest rate markets.92


85

Dash & Creswell, supra note 70.
Id.
87
See infra Part V.
88
See infra Section III.A.
89
T IES THAT B IND , supra note 58.
90
See infra Section III.A.
91
See infra Section III.B.
92
See infra Section III.C.
86
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A. Credit Derivatives and Their Ethics
The credit derivatives phenomenon has a number of ingredients. These
include financial engineering on Wall Street, congressional encouragement to
affirmative lending, facilitation by government-sponsored housing agencies
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, questionable practices in mortgage lending and
marketing of derivatives, problems with credit ratings by rating agencies, and
failure of Congress to regulate derivatives despite sufficient warnings. Each
had its own limited logic. Together, however, they formed the heady mixture
that caused the Financial Crisis of 2008–2009, followed by unprecedented
financial intervention by the U.S. government through the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) and by the Federal Reserve with its quantitative
easing. The components of the derivatives imbroglio are discussed below.
1. Financial Engineering on Wall Street
The financial community, understandably, is in a constant quest to
improve returns for clients. For investors looking for fixed income securities,
the effort was to increase yield by combining low-risk/low-return debt (e.g.,
treasury bonds) with high-risk/high-return debt (e.g., credit card debt and junk
bonds).93 The goal was to achieve optimal risk-return balance.94 This was the
theory behind pooling a variety of debt securities into credit derivatives
consisting of a range of portfolios: corporate bonds, residential mortgages,
automobile loans, credit card debt, and so on.95 These pools were named
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), Collateralized Loan Obligations
(CLO), and so on.96 By creating and selling these derivatives, banks could
transfer their loan portfolios and the risk in them to investors and free up their
capital. This would enable them to lend more, leading to credit expansion.
The pools in CDO/CLO contained debt of varying quality that had been
put together. Credit rating was used to divide the pool into different slices or
tranches according to the level of risk. This would help in selling individual
tranches to different investors according to their risk appetite. Treasury bonds
and secured corporate debt would have high credit rating, but low return.97
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Conversely, subprime mortgages and credit card debt would have low rating
but high returns.98 Investors could buy a tranche of debt that matched their risk
tolerance level and the yield was acceptable.
The debt portfolios, or credit derivatives as they came to be called, were
obviously complex pools and making sense of them was a challenge. To
overcome this problem, credit rating was used as a tool. In buying the
tranches, investors did not have to rely solely on representations from sellers.
They could look to the rating given by expert agencies.
A further protection for the buyers of credit derivatives, in particular the
high-risk tranches, was Credit Default Swaps (CDS). These are similar to
credit insurance. Investors could purchase CDS from companies such as
American International Group (AIG) to protect themselves against default. In
this arrangement, the CDS seller would be liable to pay in case of default by
borrowers of the underlying debt. More significantly, they also had to pay in
case of a fall in market value of the credit derivatives held by investors.
Finally, banks that sold the derivatives retained the most risky part of the
portfolio, which was termed the “toxic waste.” This provided further assurance
to investors who purchased the other tranches. These were the building blocks
on which derivatives trade was structured.99
It would be hard to find moral faults with the credit derivatives business
as it developed on Wall Street—up to the stage described. There was
economic substance in the transactions, and also a purpose. Investors looking
for better yield from fixed-income securities were offered instruments that
promised higher returns. The picture got murkier with the advent of
“synthetic” credit derivatives developed for “reference” portfolios of debt. The
synthetic version did not, in fact, have actual debt portfolios in them but were
built on other portfolios; hence their name. JPMorgan with its BISTRO (Broad
Index Synthetic Trust Offering) was among the first to offer synthetic CDO
that were purely speculative.100
With synthetic CDO and reference portfolios, banks sold non-existent
bundles of debt.101 Several reference portfolios were constructed for a given
bundle of debt and this practice, coupled with sale of CDS for synthetic CDO,
contributed to systemic risk.102 Buyers of synthetic credit derivatives had an
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incentive that could be termed perverse. They stood to gain on default in the
debt portfolio, which triggered liability of the CDS seller.103 Buyers of
synthetic derivatives would pay a fraction of the value of the reference
portfolio and use the money to purchase default swaps.104 JPMorgan’s
BISTRO had a value of $10 billion for its reference portfolio of debt, but was
funded only to the extent of $700 million or seven percent.105 With the default
swaps in hand, buyers of synthetic credit derivatives could collect money from
the swap seller if there was a default in the underlying portfolio or a fall in its
market value.
AIG was a large seller of default swaps. It sold swaps both for real credit
derivatives that had debt portfolios and the synthetic version modeled on the
real ones.106 Synthetic credit derivatives and default swaps for them multiplied
the liability of swap sellers several times the actual value of the debt in real
portfolios.107 This was the systemic risk in credit derivatives.108 Payment
obligations for swap sellers could be a multiple of the value of the debt covered
by the swaps.109 This factor contributed to the meltdown in AIG in 2008,
which was averted by financial assistance from the Federal Reserve.110
Synthetic CDO and default swaps for them probably pushed the line of
ethics. The legitimacy of the instruments and selling them in the market were
both questionable. They represented a move from legitimate risk-taking into
the realm of pure speculation. This was, moreover, speculation of a destructive
variety because buyers of CDS for synthetic CDO would profit only on the
happening of a negative event—namely, default in the underlying portfolio or
fall in its market value. These buyers had no substantive economic interest in
the debt, but they had a vested interest in default or other negative
developments. To this extent, the ethics of recent financial engineering on
Wall Street is open to challenge. However, the financial sector was not the
only actor on the scene.
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2. Affirmative Lending, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac
The bundling of debt into credit derivatives and selling them in the
market happened alongside an explosion in lending. There were at least three
factors in this development. One was the expansion of mortgage market funds,
which grew from under $100 billion in 1996 to a peak of over $600 billion in
2005.111 A second factor was the stepping up of role by the governmentsponsored enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—in the mortgage
market. The share of GSEs went up from 5 percent of the total market funds in
the 1970s, gradually increasing in the following decades to cross 50 percent in
the early 1990s.112 The GSE’s share stayed at this level except for a dip to
about 40 percent during the years of the Credit Crisis.113 By 2010, the
percentage had leapt back to 54.114 The data underscores the influence
government policy had in the growth of the mortgage market in recent decades.
This was a causal factor in the development of credit derivatives, which were
bought in large numbers by the GSEs.
The two factors—namely, increased role of GSEs and expansion of the
mortgage market—occurred in the backdrop of encouragement to affirmative
lending under Congressional policy. This was an important factor in the
subprime phenomenon. Direct policy intervention in lending began with the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA)115 enacted during Jimmy
Carter’s presidency (1976–1980). It continued with the social justice and
affirmative action themes that animated the Great Society vision of President
Lyndon Johnson (1963–1968). Earlier efforts in housing were the Fair
Housing Act (1968),116 the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974),117 and the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (1975).118 These laws attempted to remove
non-economic barriers to housing finance and used disclosures and
transparency to encourage lending to weaker sections.
The effort under the CRA was more direct. It extended the affirmative
principle to lending and encouraged banks to meet “the credit needs of [the]
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entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods,
consistent with the safe and sound operation” of the banks.119 Starting as a
commendatory principle, it was strengthened over the years.120 In 1989, the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)121
introduced a procedure for evaluating banks that had their affirmative lending
record as one of the measures. In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act122 listed the CRA score of banks among the criteria
for grant of license to open interstate branches. These incentives encouraged
commercial banks to increase affirmative lending and drove the growth of
subprime lending in the years that followed.123
Another direct measure came from the Federal Housing Enterprises
Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992.124 This legislation required
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to set specific goals for purchase of loans made
to low-income groups and underserved housing areas.125 This was a major
economic facilitator of subprime lending.126 It provided a stream of funding
and reduced the risk for banks in affirmative lending.127 Government policies
led to a steep rise in subprime mortgages from the mid-1990s.128 The subprime
category rose from under 10% of total mortgages in 1996 to over 23% in
2006.129
3. Mortgage Selling Practices
To reiterate, banks’ ability to sell mortgage loan accounts was an
important factor in the derivatives saga.130 This improved banks’ ability to
offer new mortgages to customers.131 This incentive clearly, encouraged banks
to sell mortgage securities packaged into derivatives and they were not too
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particular about the methods adopted for the purpose.132 The anecdotal
instances, presented below, reveal the trends and their consequences.
Countrywide Financial, which was later acquired by Bank of
America, had a fast-lane lending program nicknamed
“hustle.”133 Under the program, employees were awarded
bonuses based on how fast they disbursed loans.134 This led to
compromises on borrower verification and the loans were later
sold Fannie and Freddie.135 A jury has found Bank of America
liable for its practices and the government seeks $848 million in
damages.136
Out of the total settlement of $13 billion that JPMorgan Chase has
agreed to, $5.1 billion is payable to the GSEs for the shoddy
mortgages sold to them.137
Wells Fargo paid $335 million to settle claims of the GSEs about
misstatements made in the mortgage securities the bank sold
them.138
Dexia, a European bank that purchased mortgages from JPMorgan,
has filed a lawsuit alleging that JPMorgan adjusted critical
reviews to hide fraudulent home appraisals and overextended
borrowers.139
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) made a settlement of $153.7million
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over
misstatements in the sale of mortgages to investors.140
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Other than Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were large purchasers of
subprime mortgages, there were also smaller, private buyers as the data show.
In addition to mortgage selling practices, other related misconduct has also
been reported against banks.
Goldman Sachs betted against its own credit product and paid SEC
$550 million to settle the case.141
Bear Sterns and Credit Suisse received compensation ($137.8
million and $5.7 million respectively) from sellers of shoddy
mortgages, but did not pass on to the customers to whom they
sold the mortgages.142
4. Derivatives and Regulatory Issues
Government policy, discussed above, facilitated banks’ mortgage
business and this was compounded by the omission to regulate derivatives,
which were a by-product of the mortgage business. The problems with
derivatives have been known for several years. Derivatives received constant
attention from policymakers during the 1990s. Thomas surveyed the five
proposals that were introduced in Congress, with varying regulatory
approaches.143 The legislative proposals included the following:
Setting up a Federal Derivative Commission144
Creating a self-regulatory agency for derivatives dealers145
Tightening internal controls in financial institutions146
Standards of financial responsibility applicable to derivatives
dealers147
Grant of authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to oversee derivatives dealers and insurance companies
(e.g. AIG)148
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Ban on use of derivatives by regulated entities for speculation149
Together, the proposals were comprehensive in scope and content.
Although lacking a common thread, laws based on their principles could have
checked derivatives and their downsides. But the 1990s was the era of
deregulation. Regulatory efforts fell by the wayside. Brooksley Born, then
chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), was among the
few who called for regulation.150 But she was rebuffed.151 Powerful voices
opposed regulation, including Alan Greenspan, Larry Summers, Robert Rubin,
and Arthur Levitt.152
Derivatives, or more precisely trade in them, are now regulated under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.153 The
Dodd-Frank Act essentially regulates derivatives trade transactions by
promoting transparency and better order in the market. It makes little effort to
interfere with the speculative features that created systemic instability – for
example, synthetic CDO and multiple CDS for a single portfolio of debt.154
5. Credit Rating Issues
Credit rating agencies’ work can be cited as yet another factor in the
derivatives phenomenon. Rating agencies were targeted by critics and
regulators when the financial markets unraveled during the Crisis of 2008–09.
There can be a basic issue with the business model of credit rating. The
agencies normally work for the groups who would benefit from their rating,
such as sellers of derivatives, and this can affect the independence of the
agencies. Another potential explanation for the reportedly questionable quality
of credit rating was the complex nature of the pools of debt and the
mathematical models that were developed for valuing them.155
To be clear, treatment of subprime mortgages is an important criticism
leveled against the rating agencies. However, in a universe of rising residential
values, it might not be unrealistic for the agencies to assume that prices will
continue to increase in the future – as they had done in the past. This
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reasoning, apparently, underpinned the model. Gillian Tett pointed out:
While America’s corporate world had suffered several booms and recessions in
the later 20th century, the housing market had followed a steady path of
growth[,] . . . [b]ut since the second world war, there had never been a
nationwide house-price slump.156

If house prices could only go up, credit histories of individual borrowers
mattered little. If a borrower defaulted, the house could always be sold and the
loan recovered. This reasoning can explain, if not justify, much of the ratings
awarded by the agencies for the credit derivatives created by the banks. Again,
lack of diligence was not exclusive to sellers of derivatives or credit rating
agencies. It equally afflicted buyers. Bayerische Landesbank, a German bank
interested in buying credit derivatives that included subprime mortgages, was
ready to make the purchase even without data on potential defaults.157
Significantly, the SEC has not brought criminal charges against rating
agencies. In a 2010 report, the SEC criticized Moody’s for issuing high ratings
based on a coding error and for not revising the ratings after discovering the
error.158 The Department of Justice filed a civil lawsuit against Standard &
Poor’s in 2013 claiming damages of $5 billion, and according to a recent
report, the agency is willing to pay $1 billion in settlement without admitting
any wrongdoing.159
Several factors, thus, contributed to the derivatives phenomenon. The
challenge for ethical theory is to deal with deficiencies of this nature. Within
banks, it was the lack of diligence and prudence combined with behavior that
was clearly unethical. These were compounded by external factors, mainly a
ready market for mortgage securities. These factors have inflicted a huge cost
on the banks and their shareholders in the form of penalties and settlements.160
B. Banks in Non-Financial Markets
This section reviews banks’ participation in non-financial markets that
raises serious ethical concerns. Banks went beyond simple investment in non-
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financial avenues that were opened up by deregulatory legislation such as the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act.161 Questionable practices by banks
are reported in the aluminum market, which is unregulated, in electric power,
which is a regulated utility and in ethanol credits, which are needed for
regulatory compliance. 162
1. Goldman Sachs in the Aluminum Market
Goldman Sachs bought a warehousing company in 2010 and reportedly
lengthened the storage time of aluminum to create shortages and drive prices
up.163 Goldman offered storage to clients who invested in aluminum,
presumably on advice from Goldman.164 The clients were also offered
incentives to extend storage.165 The stocks were moved around among
warehouses to skirt London Metal Exchange (LME) regulations on storage
period.166 The practice created shortages in aluminum markets and pushed up
prices.167 The additional cost for American consumers over three years has
been estimated at $5 billion.168
A further twist is Goldman’s presence in LME, which regulates the
aluminum market.169 LME is owned by its members that included Goldman
Sachs, Barclays Bank, and Citigroup.170 The President of Goldman’s
warehouse subsidiary sat on the warehouse committee of LME that made the
rules on storage times.171 Goldman was apparently a player at both ends – with
a seat on the rule-making committee at the exchange and in making use of the
rules for its advantage.172
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2. JPMorgan I – Power Business
In the acquisition of Bear Stearns in 2008, JPMorgan also obtained rights
to sell electricity from some power plants.173 The plants were inefficient and
operated with obsolete technology.174 Between September 2010 and June
2011, JPMorgan executives adopted several schemes to offer energy at prices
“calculated to falsely appear attractive.”175 This resulted in overpayments by
power authorities in California and Michigan.176 When an investigation was
launched, JPMorgan did not cooperate and drove the regulators to court to
obtain documents.177 The bank allegedly “planned and executed a systematic
cover-up.”178 JPMorgan has settled the California case by paying $410 million
in penalty and disgorgement, and has also given up disputed claims of $265
million.179
3. JPMorgan II – Ethanol Credits
To promote the use of renewable fuel, federal regulations require mixing
gasoline with ethanol and a carrot-and-stick approach is used for
enforcement.180 Failure to add ethanol can result in fines up to $32,500 a day,
while compliance earns credits.181 The credits are transferable and this
presents an opportunity for profit.182 There is a market for ethanol credits
because of the problems in storing ethanol-mixed gasoline at conventional gas
stations.183184 Ethanol-mixed gasoline causes faster corrosion of tanks.185 The
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choice is, therefore, between renovating the facilities and purchasing ethanol
credits.186 Gas stations often prefer to purchase credits and thereby save on the
investment that is needed for upgrading their facilities.187 This has contributed
to the growth of the ethanol credits market.188
Trade in ethanol credits requires registration with the US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), which is open to anyone – not just persons who earn
credits and those who want to buy them for use.189 In keeping with recent
orthodoxy, the EPA conceived the open structure to encourage a free market in
ethanol credits.190 Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan, Citigroup, and Barclays are
among the registered traders.191 The ethanol credits market has seen a twentyfold price increase in six months.192 Reportedly JPMorgan is a major purchaser
of the credits and its strategy is to “buy up every available credit.”193
It is apparent that the activities of banks in non-financial markets,
narrated above, are not simple investments.194 They were attempts to profiteer
through ethically-questionable methods. The cases are hardly border line. For
Goldman Sachs, it would be legitimate to advise clients on investments and
help improve returns. But the issue becomes ethical when efforts are made to
manipulate markets and drive prices up, imposing unreasonable costs on
consumers. This case is no different with JPMorgan’s power business schemes
that had clear ethical dimensions. With ethanol credits, JPMorgan used its
financial power to build a commanding position in the market. This can
explain the steep rise in the price of credits.195
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C. Rate Manipulation – LIBOR and Forex
Manipulation of interest and exchange rates is another major class of
financial misconduct. The LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offer Rate) scandal
surfaced in 2011 and huge penalties were levied on major banks. It has also
led to changes in the system for setting the anchor rate. Forex market practices
are more recent and investigation is still underway.
1. The LIBOR Issue
The emergence of LIBOR as a benchmark can be traced to financial
globalization, the emergence of flexible or floating interest rates under the
Garn–St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,196 and, more recently,
the development of interest rate derivatives.197 The core complaint against
banks is that they misreported the rates at which they could borrow in the
London money market.198 Until April 2013, LIBOR was constructed by British
Bankers’ Association (BBA), an industry group, based on inputs from the
international banks on BBA’s LIBOR panel.199 The panel banks would
regularly report the rates at which they could borrow in the London market and
BBA would set the rate by eliminating the highest and lowest of the reported
rates and averaging the rest.200 This average rate is LIBOR, published
worldwide by Thomson Reuters.201 LIBOR is reported for transactions in
several currencies and for many tenors, such as one, three, and six months.202
LIBOR is the anchor or the benchmark rate in variable rate credit
transactions worldwide.203 The banks on BBA’s LIBOR panel are among the
largest in the world and the rate at which they can borrow is treated as the
lowest possible interest in financial markets.204 LIBOR forms the basis for
other loan transactions and a premium is added for borrowers depending on
their credit standing, perceived level of risk and similar factors.205
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As a benchmark, LIBOR determines the effective rate of interest in
myriad credit transactions.206 Its impact is enormous.207 According to John
Kiff, there are “uncounted tens of billions of dollars of adjustable rate home
mortgages and other consumer loans around the globe in which LIBOR, in one
way or another, is referenced.”208 LIBOR is also a standard in interest rate
derivatives and forward rate agreements, which are used both for risk
protection and speculation.209 The Wheatley Review placed “the notional
value of financial products using LIBOR” at a minimum of $300 trillion, and
also referred to a “number of other estimates . . . ranging from $300 trillion up
to $800 trillion.”210
LIBOR was misreported both on the higher and the lower sides.211 There
were several incentives for misreporting rates, including illicit gain for rate
submitters from traders in interest rate derivatives, efforts by senior
management during the Credit Crisis to reduce perceptions of risk, and an
apparent misunderstanding by Barclays’ CEO that the Bank of England
indicated a wish for reporting lower rates.212 Networks of employees across
banks misreported rates at one another’s behest, often for illicit personal
gain.213 This was linked to trade in interest rate derivatives, which are another
product of financial engineering.214 Like with credit derivatives, the original
rationale for interest rate derivatives was to manage risks – in this case, floating
rates of interest would be converted to fixed rates.215 But soon a market
developed for trade in these derivatives with speculation becoming a feature.216
The Wheatley Review, commissioned by the UK government in the
wake of the scandal, made a number of recommendations. These included
transfer of the LIBOR setting process to a new regulator, use of actual
transaction data for the purpose, and strengthening internal controls at the
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reporting banks.217 The recommendations have been accepted by the UK
government. The episode, which involved wrongdoing in banks, imposed costs
on the banks running to several hundred million dollars. UBS of Switzerland
paid penalties of $1.5 billion to regulators in UK and US while Barclays paid
$450 million. For the Royal Bank of Scotland, the cost of settlement was over
$600 million.218
Personal gain was a factor in the misreporting of rates by bank
employees. To the extent misreporting generated profits, the banks were also
beneficiaries. The breach of ethics in earning these profits is apparent and
penalties have been paid as the cost of the breach. Significantly, reports also
refer to a potential role of regulators in the LIBOR phenomenon. Bank of
England is said to have encouraged banks to report lower rates.219 The New
York Federal Reserve was aware of misreporting of rates, but did nothing.220
2. Forex Rates Manipulation
Regulators in UK, US, Germany, and Switzerland are pursuing
investigations into forex rate manipulation. A charge that has surfaced is that
bank employees would execute transactions for clients and then wait for
movements in rates before reporting to clients. If rate movements were
favorable, transactions would be reported at higher rates.221 Quite obviously,
this would benefit the banks/their employees.
The city of Philadelphia and a group of institutional investors have filed
an antitrust lawsuit against twelve large banks accusing them of rigging the
forex market. According to the suit, bank employees used names such as The
Cartel, The Bandits’ Club, and The Mafia, and swapped confidential customer
orders and trading positions. They colluded to set prices. The methods that
were used had interesting names – “'front running/trading ahead,' 'banging the
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close,' and 'painting the screen.'"222
Banks have initiated several measures in response. More than thirty
employees in different banks have been dismissed or suspended.223 Since a
culture of conversation among employees across banks contributed to the
phenomenon, banks have started switching to electronic operations to reduce
human intervention in the forex market.224 To eliminate conflicts of interests,
Deutsche Bank, RBS, and UBS are reported to be “reviewing rules on
currencies traders making bets with their own money”.225 The fact that they
could do so, to begin with, offers an important insight into the culture at the
banks.
With interest and forex rate manipulation, the case is clearer. Ethics was
compromised, for corporate profits or personal gains for employees or possibly
both. In all cases, banks’ customers – City of Detroit, to name one226 – were
the victims.
IV. FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT AND THE ETHICAL ORDER
Misconduct in the financial sector, serial and varied, creates significant
ethical challenges. This part explores whether, in the aftermath of recent
events, an ethical order can still be treated as endogenous to the financial
sector. The issue is examined from the prism of the Social Contracts Theory,
which is underpinned by the efficiency hypernorm.227
In broad terms, the argument is that a moral order can arise from within
the market. A combination of cultural and business factors would contribute to
this outcome. Donaldson and Dunfee explained how implicit contracts are a
part of the basic software of business ethics in the social contracts framework.
The efficiency hypernorm that underpins these contracts motivates actors to
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achieve social goods such as health, education, housing, food, clothing, and
social justice.228 Other than protecting property rights, the hypernorm also
requires duties and public remedies to support key business behaviors such as
keeping promises.229 The framework borrows from the contractarian principles
of classicists–Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Rawls–to strengthen the
social argument and to identify an innate tendency in the community to
develop efficient arrangements based on trust and reciprocity. In broad terms,
rational actors will develop institutions that are geared to achieve the social
goods and those actors are informed by ethical conduct that promotes overall
welfare.
The general validity of the social contract framework is undeniable. It
was evident in the self-governing traditions in leading Anglo-American
business institutions–namely, the joint stock company and the stock market.
The institutions were, to a significant extent, self-regulating and reflected the
trends inherent in the society. An important question is whether the challenges
and complexities of the present require more concerted response and
systematic management. Specifically in the financial sector, some major
problems that undermine the social contract theory are power and equational
imbalances among actors, imperfections in enforcement, and changes in
operational methods.
These issues are examined below. The current
environment, conditioned by the factors pointed out, is complex and
increasingly impersonal.
Approaches based on traditional contracting
principles may need refinement in this setting.
A. Power Imbalances
Accommodative policies of the Federal Reserve and implicit government
guarantees emerged in the 1990s, crystallizing with the rescue of Long Term
Capital Management.230 These policies undermine the culture of caution in
which banks traditionally operated.231 Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley's
decision to adopt bank holding company structures in 2008, at the height of the
Credit Crisis, is instructive. It enabled them to access Federal Reserve
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funds.232 The structural arrangements and the safety net provided by the
Federal Reserve empower and strengthen bank executives.233 Conversely, they
weaken other stakeholders–mainly, clients who transacted with the banks and
shareholders who have borne the regulatory penalties.
Disparity and power imbalance are evident in the interest and forex rate
markets. These markets are under near-complete control of banks, which are
one of the parties to the transactions. Clients, who are the other party, lack
access to the inner workings of the market; they have much less knowledge of
the reported manipulative practices discussed above. This equation made it
possible for banks and their executives to engage in wrongful practice and to
benefit from wrongdoing, while customers lost. Therefore, imbalances in the
market can hinder the development of social contracts based on shared values
or even interests.
B. Imperfections in Enforcement
A moral order must necessarily include a remedy. Remedies are not
simply about accountability, ex post, but are equally about having mechanisms
that promote responsible behavior. In responding to financial misconduct,
ranging from mortgage securities to manipulation of interest and exchange
rates, government agencies have been at the forefront, levying huge fines on
banks.234 Their principal method has been to levy penalties on banks.235 This
approach effectively ignores the old maxim about corporations having no
bodies to be kicked and no souls to be damned.236 This method punishes bank
shareholders, but largely ignores the accountability of the executives who were
responsible for the misconduct.
To be fair, there have been sporadic actions against a small number of
executives.
The government punished executives, including Kareem
Serageldin, former head of structured credit trading at Credit Suisse; Fabrice
Tourre, a trader at Goldman Sachs; and Jerome Kerviel of Societe Generale
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whom the government convicted for acts of unauthorized trading.237
Significantly, Kerviel of Societe Generale maintained that his superiors were
receptive to his actions as long as they were profitable.238
Government’s enforcement approach has attracted numerous criticisms.
Zuberbuhler pointed out how penalties on banks ignored individual
responsibility.239 Henning explained that senior bank managers could escape
by pointing fingers at lower-level employees.240 Ted Kaufman, a former
senator, targeted the legal profession for its role in the “complete breakdown in
effective white-collar law enforcement against the most powerful in the wake
of a devastating financial crisis.”241
Reports are available about some private litigation against bank directors
and executives. The outcome is not quite encouraging from the standpoints of
accountability and standard-setting for future conduct. In re Citigroup
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, shareholders charged Citigroup directors
with breach of fiduciary duties in overseeing the derivatives business, but the
suit was dismissed by the Delaware court.242 A suit filed against JPMorgan
directors for the loss of over $6 billion in its derivatives business–the so-called
London Whale–was dismissed by the US District Court.243 But the court
allowed the suit against CEO Jamie Dimon and former CFO Douglas
Braunstein to proceed.244 Citigroup agreed to pay $1.13 billion to purchasers
of mortgage securities.245 On balance, reports do not indicate significant
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efforts by stakeholders to hold bank executives to account, which is surprising
given the vibrancy of the plaintiff bar in the US and the incentive systems in
place.
C. Banks’ Operating Methods
There have been major changes in banking in the recent decades. For
one, banks have become larger. Another is the increasing use of online
transactions that reduces human interaction. Diminished face-to-face contact
can undermine the personal element in customer relations and consequently,
the concern for customers’ interests. These trends can encourage self-seeking
behavior by executives, at the cost of customers – be they retail mortgage
borrowers or business enterprises doing forex transactions. These are some
issues at the human or behavioral level.
At the business level, credit derivatives are an important development.
They enable banks to offload customer loan accounts by selling them to others.
This was an important factor in the subprime crisis. With derivatives, banks no
longer had to worry about the credit quality of borrowers; moral hazard was a
natural consequence. The Dodd-Frank Act, as pointed out, merely seeks to
regulate trade in credit derivatives.
Subprime credit, reportedly, continues; it has shifted in recent years from
housing loans to automobile loans. Credit derivatives are, again, at the root of
the boom in auto loans.246 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency noted
that “signs of risk in auto lending [are] beginning to emerge” and even though
the “results have yet to show large-scale deterioration at the portfolio level, . . .
signs of increasing risk are evident.”247
In sum, the financial sector is subject to myriad influences that
undermine social contracts and ethical norms. Yet the need for social values
and norms has never been greater. The conclusion explores a role for codes of
ethics in inculcating ethical norms and accountability mechanisms – as
endogenous to corporate institutions.
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V. CODES OF ETHICS – A POTENTIAL VENUE
Business ethics emerged as a regulatory concern in the 1970s.248 The
development was triggered by the corruption scandals that led to the enactment
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.249 Since the mid-1970s, several
corporations have adopted ethics codes and appointed ethics officers. Many
corporations also offer employees training programs in ethics.250 Ethics codes
made an entry in business law with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,251 which
was enacted by the Congress in response to corporate accounting scandals.
The act requires codes of ethics for senior financial officers (§ 406) and affords
protection to employees complaining about fraudulent activities in companies
(§ 806).
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 carries on with the effort to internalize
ethics, specifically in the financial sector. Agencies engaged in derivatives
trade–namely, derivatives and securities clearing agencies (§§ 725 & 763), data
depositories (§ 728), dealers and major participants (§ 731), and swap
execution facilities (§ 733) must have Chief Compliance Officers (CCO).
CCO job responsibilities include maintaining a code of ethics and a conflict-ofinterests policy, and providing annual confirmation about them.
Additionally under the corporate governance standards of the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), listed corporations must have codes of ethics.252 The
Listed Company Manual also provides guidance on the topics to be covered in
the codes. Topics include dealing with conflicts of interests, appropriate use of
corporate opportunities, confidentiality, fair dealing, taking proper care of
company assets, legal compliance, and whistleblower protection253. Ethics
codes must be posted on corporate websites and confirmation must be included
in filings with the SEC254.
The developments in regulatory ethics, outlined above, have carried the
subject of ethics beyond voluntary initiatives, cultural habits, or market
traditions. Now listed corporations are required to have ethics codes and NYSE
rules prescribe the minimum content for the codes. “Fair dealing,” which is
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among the prescribed contents, can be a powerful tool in checking deviant
behaviour and promoting the moral climate in companies. NYSE rules define
fair dealing as follows:
Each employee, officer and director should endeavor to deal fairly with the
listed company's customers, suppliers, competitors and employees. None
should take unfair advantage of anyone through manipulation, concealment,
abuse of privileged information, misrepresentation of material facts, or any
other unfair-dealing practice.255

The description sets the standard of ethical conduct in dealing with
stakeholders, including customers. The standard would be appropriate for the
financial sector. It incorporates the basic moral precepts against lying, stealing,
and cheating. An implicit feature of the standard is its “prioritization,” as
Schwartz termed it.256 This is about the overriding importance of values,
unaffected by considerations of corporate profits or personal incentives for
executives such as bonuses. The standard, if applied, can effectively check
unfair dealing even for business advantage, not just personal gain of the
executive in question. It can check much of the misconduct reported against
banks.
The experience suggests the need for ethics codes to travel beyond
providing commendatory guidance to executives. They must graduate into
more effective, self-executing frameworks that also spell out the consequences
of breach. NYSE rules are sensitive to this aspect. They require codes to have
“compliance standards and procedures that will facilitate the effective
operation.”257
A method of making ethics codes more effective would be to clarify that
executives are personally liable for the consequences of any breach of the
standards. The proposition is founded in common sense notions of justice and
fairness. It is about holding individuals accountable for their actions and
failures.
A theoretical basis for personal liability is also available in corporate law.
Piercing the corporate veil, a tool courts have long used, enables targeting
individuals acting in a representative capacity.258 Executives, as fiduciaries of
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corporations, are conventionally placed under the duties of loyalty and care.
Good faith is now recognized as the third element. Eisenberg included nonviolation of accepted standards of decency in business conduct among the
ingredients of the duty of good faith.259 This resonates with the formulation of
fair dealing in NYSE rules discussed above. A breach of the duty of good faith
can be a ground for courts to lift the corporate veil and hold executives and
directors personally liable for their actions and failures.
Provisions on personal liability can give teeth to the ethic codes. With
appropriate training, executives can be sensitized to the ethical standards they
must follow as well as the consequences of breach. This can be valuable in
guiding executive behavior and in deterring wrongful conduct.
To be clear, there can be some logistical issues. The first is about
initiating action to strengthen corporate codes of ethics on the lines discussed.
As I have pointed out, penalties have been levied on banks and the affected
group is shareholders. It would, therefore, be appropriate for shareholders to
take up the mantle. With the rise of institutional shareholders and a nascent
trend for them to communicate with corporate directors,260 shareholders are
well-placed for the task.
The second issue is about effective implementation of ethics codes,
including liability of executives for breach. Here, boards would be the obvious
candidate. With the recent emphasis on independence of directors and their
skills sets, most boards ought to possess the expertise needed for effective
oversight of the ethical governance of corporations. The Institute of Business
Ethics in the United Kingdom has recently argued for including ethics among
board responsibilities.261
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